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The Revisionist Historiography of Britain’s Decolonisation Conflicts and 
Political Science Theses of Civilian Victimisation in Counterinsurgency. 
 
Abstract: Recent historical research exposed the myth of self-restraint as the 
distinctive feature of British counterinsurgency during decolonisation. This article 
shows that the revisionist historiography of British counterinsurgency has 
important, but unnoticed, implications for political scientists. Specifically, 
historical scholarship challenges the predictions and causal mechanisms of the 
main social scientific theses of civilian victimisation in counterinsurgency. Using 
revisionist historians’ works as a source of data, I test those theses against 
Britain’s decolonisation conflicts. I find that they do not pass the test 
convincingly. I conclude that political scientists should be more willing to explore 
the theoretical implications of new historical evidence on counterinsurgency 
campaigns. 
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British counterinsurgency during decolonisation has long enjoyed the status of 
paradigm among scholars and practitioners. When compared to the brutal but 
unsuccessful campaigns of the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan, Britain’s performance in expeditionary counterinsurgency looked 
different. The conventional wisdom – reflecting the influence of Robert 
Thompson’s analysis of the British campaign in Malaya1 – maintained that 
Britain’s relative success in counterinsurgency during decolonisation resulted 
from ‘hearts and minds’ measures and limited violence against non-combatants, 
which enabled Britain to win over the local population, undermine insurgents’ 
popular base, and destroy the enemy while sparing as many innocent lives as 
possible.2 
 In the early 1990s, historians began to question the dominant narrative of British 
counterinsurgency. Showing new evidence from primary sources, revisionist 
historians highlighted that, in fact, violent coercion against civilians was at the 
core of Britain’s counterinsurgency doctrine and practice during decolonisation.3 
Revisionist historians did not claim that Britain entirely lacked discrimination in 
the use of force; they argued that ‘British counterinsurgency was conducted in a 
more complex, and also often in a more coercive way than long-prevailing 
analyses based on the alleged centrality of minimum force would suggest’.4 
Indeed, coercion against civilians in British counterinsurgency ranged from 
relatively mild measures like curfews, cordon-and-search operations, mass 
screening, collective fines, house evictions, and mass arrests to brutal measures 
like mass deportation to concentration camps or new villages, scorched earth and 
food denial, torture, the creation of free-fire zones, indiscriminate shootings, and 
summary executions.5 
Dismissing as artificial the idea that persuasion and coercion would be mutually 
exclusive in counterinsurgency, revisionist historians showed that Britain used 
both persuasive and coercive measures and the balance between the former and 
the latter changed over time and space.6 Indeed, Britain did not use the same level 
of brutality in each campaign. In some campaigns – like the Kenya Emergency 
(1952-1960) – the British targeted the local population indiscriminately, while in 
other conflicts – like the campaigns in Palestine (1945-1947) and Cyprus (1955-
1959) – Britain strove to avoid harm on non-combatants. The balance between 
coercion and persuasion did not vary only across different campaigns, but also 
during the same campaign. The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), for example, 
went through different phases and displayed a different combination of coercion 
and persuasion in each phase.7 In sum, the revisionist works on British 
counterinsurgency found a higher degree of variation in the use of indiscriminate 
violence than the conventional wisdom had acknowledged. 
This article highlights the importance of the revisionist historiography of British 
counterinsurgency during decolonisation for political scientists. More 
specifically, I show that the historical scholarship on British counterinsurgency 
challenges the main social scientific explanations for indiscriminate violence in 
anti-guerrilla warfare. Relying on the research of revisionist historians as a source 
of evidence, I will test current social scientific theses of civilian victimisation 
against the main cases of British counterinsurgency during decolonisation.8 In 
particular, I will look at the British campaigns in Palestine (1945-1947), Malaya 
(1948-1960), Kenya (1952-1960) and Cyprus (1955-1959).9 
The critical use of historical scholarship as a source of evidence to elucidate and 
test the causal logic and the explanatory power of a theory is widely accepted in 
political science research.10 However, that practice entails that political scientists 
should be ready to explore how new historical evidence and interpretations may 
affect the accuracy of their theories. Yet, while social scientific theories often 
build upon historical evidence and interpretations, political scientists do not 
always reassess the explanatory power and the causal logic of their theses in 
response to the evolution of historiographical debates; in this way, political 
scientists may fail to rethink, refine, and update their arguments, once anomalous 
historical evidence has emerged.11 
The theoretical scholarship on the causes of civilian victimisation in 
counterinsurgency mirrors this tendency. The British experience in 
counterinsurgency is prominent as a source of evidence in the social scientific 
literature on the way states fight against insurgents. Specifically, political 
scientists tend to accept the conventional wisdom on British counterinsurgency 
and often point to Britain’s alleged self-restraint as evidence confirming their 
arguments.12 Surprisingly, while historians have revised the argument that 
minimum force was the distinctive feature of British counterinsurgency during 
decolonisation, political scientists have not asked what that means for their 
theses. In sum, it looks as though the latest round of historical research on British 
violence against civilians has gone unnoticed.  
This paper shows that the revisionist scholarship on British counterinsurgency 
has serious implications for political scientists. Specifically, that scholarship often 
contradicts the predictions and the causal mechanisms of social scientific theses 
of civilian victimisation in counterinsurgency, therefore the revisionist 
historiography of Britain’s decolonisation conflicts invites political scientists to 
consider how contrary evidence bears on the validity of their theses and explore 
whether – and to what extent – the causal mechanisms and logic of their 
arguments should be amended. 
The remainder of this article will proceed as follows. As a first step, I will set 
out the main social scientific theses of civilian victimisation in 
counterinsurgency, their predictions, and the corresponding causal logic. As a 
second step, I will test those theses against the evidence emerging from 
revisionist historians’ research on Britain’s decolonisation conflicts. Relying on 
the main strengths of the case study method – the exploration and close 
observation of causal mechanisms13 – I will follow the congruence procedure 
using observations within cases. I will begin by observing the values on the 
candidate causal factors of the above-mentioned theses in the cases of interest; 
based on that, I will specify the predictions of those theses about Britain’s 
conduct towards civilians; finally, I will check if the case outcome confirms those 
predictions and if that outcome actually resulted from the posited causal 
mechanism.14 I will show that the latest historical research on the conflicts of 
British decolonisation indicates that events were rarely unfolding according to the 
predictions and causal logic of political science theses of indiscriminate violence. 
As a third step, I will present my conclusions. 
 
Political Science Theses of Civilian Victimisation in Counterinsurgency 
A glance at the history of international politics in the last two centuries would be 
enough to notice that states have often been involved in protracted campaigns 
against insurgencies abroad.15 States have fought irregular opponents beyond 
their national borders to preserve their colonies and territorial possessions, protect 
friendly governments or allied regimes from local rebellions, or remove perceived 
terrorist threats, as the recent campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq would suggest. 
 The states involved in expeditionary counterinsurgency, however, have faced 
their enemies with different military strategies. In some cases, the 
counterinsurgent tried to defeat the opponent with a relatively high level of 
indiscriminate violence and coercion, while doing the opposite in other cases; 
moreover, the level of violence against non-combatants also varied within the 
same cases. Hence a question: under which conditions do states victimise 
civilians as a strategy to defeat guerrilla insurgencies abroad?16 
The political science literature on civilian targeting as a counterinsurgency 
strategy tends to focus on the impact of indiscriminate violence on war outcome, 
thus analysing civilian victimisation as a causal factor that may explain why 
states win or lose against insurgents.17 Social scientific studies on the 
effectiveness of indiscriminate violence include self-contained causal arguments 
that clearly explain why states may choose a civilian targeting strategy in anti-
guerrilla warfare. In fact, those studies often explore the reasons why states may 
choose to target civilians, even if state leaders may be aware that indiscriminate 
violence may be ineffective or self-defeating, and vice versa.18 In addition to that, 
a fast-growing body of political science scholarship explicitly addressed civilian 
targeting in counterinsurgency as a phenomenon to be explained regardless of its 
effect on war outcome.19 Looking at the political science literature, therefore, one 
can spot rival theses about the causes of civilian victimisation in 
counterinsurgency. Those theses point to competing causal factors like regime 
type, military organisational interests, military culture, force structure and 
intelligence collection capabilities, the perceived image of the opponent, and the 
military power of the insurgent that may exacerbate the counterinsurgent’s 
desperation to win. 
 
Regime Type and Civilian Victimisation 
Scholars disagree about the impact of regime type on the use of indiscriminate 
violence in counter-guerrilla warfare. Some authors contend that liberal 
democracies would be unlikely to victimise civilians, especially in non-existential 
conflicts like counterinsurgency campaigns abroad. Gil Merom, in particular, 
argues that when democratic leaders try to use civilian targeting strategies, small 
groups of educated middle-class citizens would exploit democratic norms 
allowing public debate to repudiate indiscriminate violence as morally 
unacceptable and turn the domestic public opinion against the government; faced 
with massive moral indignation and the prospect of political defeat, elected 
leaders would eventually give in to public pressure and fall back on self-restraint 
strategies.20 
Other scholars, instead, warn that elected leaders would be anxious to keep 
down the human and financial costs of non-existential conflicts on their own side 
to prevent a loss of consent and achieve tenure in office.21 Military strategies 
relying on overwhelming firepower and indiscriminate violence would fit the 
purpose. Indeed, those strategies would replace manpower with capital (tanks, 
artillery, aircraft etc.), which would reduce soldiers’ exposure to the insurgent’s 
firepower; capital-intensive strategies would also charge the financial costs of 
counterinsurgency campaigns on a relatively insignificant number of wealthy 
voters.22 Democracies, in sum, would target civilians in counterinsurgency 
because indiscriminate violence would protect the life and wealth of most citizens 
on their side, while saving leaders’ chances to win the next elections. 
 
Military Organisational Factors and Civilian Victimisation 
Another group of arguments suggests that civilian targeting would depend on the 
characteristics of the military organisation fighting against the insurgent and civil-
military relations, rather than regime type. 
Some scholars point to military organisational interests as a cause of civilian 
targeting.23 They build on the bureaucratic politics assumption that all 
organisations pursue independence from external oversight, control over their 
own affairs, and more financial resources.24 As bureaucratic entities, military 
organisations would prefer strategies conceived to destroy the enemy and its 
popular base through preponderant technology and firepower; indeed, that type of 
strategy, while harming non-combatants, would make for higher military budgets 
and tighter control over the conduct of military operations.25 Consequently, states 
would be more likely to victimise non-combatants when political leaders are 
unwilling or unable to restrain military organisations’ institutional preference for 
the indiscriminate use of force.26 
Still other scholars argue that the preferences of military organisations about 
how to fight would derive from military culture that would set standards of 
appropriate behaviour. Military culture would express military organisations’ 
beliefs about their own identity, essence and purpose, which would cause military 
organisations to look at some types of force employment as appropriate and 
dismiss others as incompatible with their own identity, regardless of the perceived 
identity of the enemy.27 According to this argument, civilian victimisation would 
be more likely when military culture stresses the exemplary punishment of the 
enemy as the task defining the identity and mission of a military organisation and 
political leaders do not intervene to restrain the army.28 
Another argument stresses that the way military organisations deal with non-
combatants depends on force structure intended as ‘the specific mixture of 
materiel and personnel that compromises a military’s war-making capabilities’.29 
This argument predicts that military organisations would be likely to use 
indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency when their force structure is based 
on mechanisation. Mechanised militaries would have limited manpower 
compared to machines, which would undermine their ability to interact with the 
local population, win civilians’ trust, and obtain intelligence about insurgents.30 
Lacking information about the enemy, mechanised forces could not distinguish 
combatants from non-combatants and would use violence indiscriminately; when 
force structure is based on manpower, instead, the counterinsurgent would be 
more likely to obtain intelligence about the enemy and use violence only against 
the insurgent.31 
 
The Image of the Enemy and Civilian Victimisation 
Another argument rooted in social identity theory holds that the perceived 
identity of the enemy would be the main cause of civilian victimisation in 
warfare. According to social identity theory, human beings tend to place each 
other into different social groups and show greater suspicion and aggressiveness 
against members of out-groups.32 This tendency may be more prominent during 
an armed conflict and it may propel indiscriminate violence. The belief that one is 
dealing with an out-group of ‘evil’, ‘barbaric’, or even ‘sub-human’ individuals 
would broaden the scope of what is morally acceptable in warfare so that 
indiscriminate violence would be seen as fully legitimate, if not desirable.33 
According to Hugo Slim, the demonisation of the enemy would mirror a radical 
anti-civilian ideology according to which there is no such a thing as a non-
combatant in the enemy population.34 However, the vilification of non-
combatants can also derive from the ambiguity of the civilian identity in warfare. 
Even if they may never carry guns, civilians may often participate – more or less 
willingly – in the conflict between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent by 
providing the former with economic support, food, shelter, and information.35 
Under those conditions, the counterinsurgent may perceive civilians as 
accomplices of the enemy and may regard the populace as a military target.  
In conclusion, if the counterinsurgent vilifies the insurgent and its popular base, 
civilian victimisation will occur; otherwise, the counterinsurgent will be self-
restrained. 
 
Desperation to Win and Civilian Victimisation 
Rejecting all the explanations set out above, the latest political science 
scholarship maintains that indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency would be 
a strategy of later resort deriving from desperation to win against powerful and 
popular insurgencies. 
This thesis assumes that states want quick victories with low combat losses, 
which is why state leaders would refrain from civilian targeting in the beginning 
of a campaign.36 Indeed, indiscriminate violence may exacerbate resistance from 
victim groups and cause civilians to side with insurgents, which would increase 
the duration and costs of the conflict.37 Yet, when hostilities last longer than 
expected, population control has been lost, combat casualties mount, and victory 
seems in question, state leaders would become desperate to defeat the insurgent 
and the risks of a civilian targeting strategy would appear less significant than its 
potential advantages: specifically, civilian victimisation would crush the 
insurgent’s popular base and prevent the implementation of a guerrilla strategy.38 
Therefore, the desperation thesis would predict that civilian targeting will be 
very limited, if not absent, in the early stage of counterinsurgency campaigns 
when the counterinsurgent is still confident in a quick victory with limited losses. 
The counterinsurgent, however, will escalate indiscriminate violence as the 
conflict goes on, but only if insurgents have gained population control and have 
become militarily powerful; otherwise, the counterinsurgent will be self-
restrained and will not target civilians.39 
 
Testing Theses of Civilian Victimisation on Britain’s Decolonisation 
Conflicts. 
While political scientists have provided evidence showing the plausibility of their 
arguments, current theses of civilian victimisation need more tests. Indeed, some 
of the most important studies on civilian targeting addressed interstate 
conventional conflicts and examined counterinsurgency to a very limited extent, 
even if their authors do insist that their arguments would apply to anti-guerrilla 
warfare too.40 Other works did focus on counterinsurgency but their authors 
simply considered extreme forms of civilian targeting, observing only those 
campaigns in which the counterinsurgent intentionally perpetrated mass murder 
or genocide.41 Finally, other works that looked at expeditionary 
counterinsurgency studied only one or two campaigns, which means that the 
causal logic of their arguments about indiscriminate violence has not been tested 
extensively.42 
 In this article, I test the above-mentioned arguments and their causal logic 
against the main conflicts of British decolonisation after 1945. In particular, I will 
look at historians’ research on Britain’s counterinsurgency in Palestine (1945-
1947), Malaya (1948-1960), Kenya (1952-1960), and Cyprus (1955-1959). In 
pursuit of my research aim, I will rely on the congruence procedure and I will use 
the revisionist historical research on British counterinsurgency during 
decolonisation as a source of data, as explained above. I will check whether the 
specific outcome on the use of indiscriminate violence is correctly predicted by 
the theses being tested and whether that outcome actually resulted from the 
posited causal mechanism. I find that historical evidence about Britain’s conduct 
towards non-combatants often runs counter to the predictions of political science 
theses of civilian victimisation and the respective causal processes. 
 
Political Science Theses of Civilian Victimisation against Historical Evidence 
Despite the importance of the revisionist research on Britain’s decolonisation 
conflicts, political scientists have paid scant attention to it. Indeed, looking at 
social scientific studies on civilian victimisation, one can find that Britain’s 
counterinsurgency campaigns during decolonisation are still mentioned as 
instances of self-restraint reflecting a ‘benevolent approach to 
counterinsurgency’.43 The recent historiography of British decolonisation 
conflicts does not confirm such a positive assessment and challenges the 
explanatory power of political science theses of civilian victimisation in 
counterinsurgency. 
 Britain’s conduct to civilians would not confirm the predictions of the regime 
type argument and its causal processes in important cases. The democratic 
restraint version of the regime type argument is contradicted by Britain’s 
relentless use of indiscriminate brutality in Kenya. The Kenya Emergency (1952-
1960) was one of the fiercest decolonisation campaigns fought by Britain. During 
the campaign in Kenya over a million civilians were deported to new villages 
where they experienced forced labour, beatings and torture, sexual abuses, food 
deprivation, malnutrition, starvation, and disease;44 thousands suffered torture 
during screening operations;45 over 430 cases of indiscriminate shootings were 
recorded in the first six months of the conflict.46 According to a conservative 
estimate, at least 12,000 adult non-combatants – mostly women – and 26,000 
children under the age of ten died during the Kenya Emergency because of 
violence or the disruptions caused by Britain’s repression.47 
Considering that Britain was one of the most democratic states in the world 
during decolonisation, the restraining effects of democracy should have been 
easily observable. Instead, not only did Britain target civilians in Kenya, but 
British leaders could also overcome any concern about the risk of an outraged 
reaction from the domestic society. While critical voices invariably accompanied 
the indiscriminate use of force in the colonies, the British public opinion never 
turned against the government on the ill-treatment of civilians in those 
campaigns.48 
 The latest historical studies on the Kenya Emergency, for example, point out 
that the Labour opposition in the House of Commons, the British press, and the 
other media did very little to expose the systematic ill-treatment of non-
combatants and the public opinion was mildly interested in the fate of civilians in 
Kenya until 1955 when military operations had almost ceased.49 After the mass 
deportation of the Kikuyu tribe, the dreadful conditions of living of potential Mau 
Mau sympathisers in concentration camps generated more outcry in Britain than 
ever before, but the government’s conduct did not change: the British Cabinet 
successfully resisted all objections and carried on with its policies.50 
 The democratic restraint thesis would apparently perform better in the case of 
the Malayan Emergency as Britain exercised much more discrimination in the use 
of violence compared to Kenya. Overall, the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) 
was far less brutal than the British campaign in Kenya. Yet, if we think of the 
British campaign in Malaya as a protracted conflict with different phases – as 
revisionist historians suggest51 – rather than a monolithic whole, the democratic 
restraint thesis would not pass the test of the Malayan Emergency convincingly. 
Recent studies on the Malayan Emergency showed that in the early stage of the 
conflict – from June 1948 to December 1949 – Britain adopted a military strategy 
based on counter-terror, property destruction, forced population movement, and 
the indiscriminate use of firepower.52 The democratic restraint thesis could not 
explain why democratic Britain adopted a counter-terror strategy in the first phase 
of the campaign and deliberately targeted civilians with the destruction of 
villages, mass deportations, and indiscriminate shootings until the end of 1949.53 
Perhaps more importantly, if we look at the following phases of the conflict – the 
‘clear and hold’ phase of 1950-1952 with the transfer of almost 400,000 Chinese 
squatters to new villages and the ‘optimisation’ phase of 1952-1960 marked by 
hearts and minds measures54 – the causal logic of the democratic restraint thesis is 
not confirmed. Indeed, Britain’s conduct towards civilians was shaped by the 
strategic situation on the field rather than a concern with British public opinion’s 
moral outrage against civilian targeting. In particular, Britain’s self-restraint after 
1952 was a direct consequence of the successful resettlement of Chinese civilians 
– sometimes coerced, sometimes not – that separated insurgents from their 
popular base and enabled Britain to discriminate combatants from non-
combatants more effectively.55 
The case of Malaya would not support the democratic propellant version of the 
regime type argument that would predict that British leaders should have adopted 
a civilian targeting strategy to shift the costs of the conflict to the opponent and 
save their domestic popularity. In fact, Britain was relatively self-restrained and 
British leaders had no concerns that they could lose the next elections because of 
the costs of the Malayan Emergency.56 
The democratic propellant thesis, however, would correctly predict the use of 
civilian victimisation in Kenya, as Britain did target non-combatants in that 
campaign. Yet, even in that case the revisionist historical scholarship on Britain’s 
decolonisation conflicts would challenge the causal logic of the democratic 
propellant thesis according to which civilian targeting would derive from elected 
leaders’ effort to achieve tenure in office. In fact, British leaders never showed 
any concern that the campaign in Kenya could determine the fate of the 
government in Britain. Indeed, the British Cabinet looked at the Kenya 
Emergency as a minor conflict against weak opponents in the periphery of the 
Empire.57 Furthermore, as we have just seen, the British parliament and public 
opinion rarely took an interest in the Kenya Emergency and, when they did so, 
the government successfully defended its policies. As a result, the use of 
indiscriminate violence in those campaigns seems to have little to do with British 
leaders’ fear to lose the next elections. Overall, the performance of the regime 
type argument is dubious at best: both the democratic restraint and the democratic 
propellant theses fail tests that should have passed easily. 
The theses looking at military institutional and cultural factors as the mainspring 
of civilian targeting would equally find favourable conditions to explain Britain’s 
brutality against civilians during decolonisation, as confirmed by revisionist 
historians themselves. For example, revisionist historians stress that in the 1940s 
and 1950s the principle of non-combatant immunity was not yet embedded in the 
British Army’s military culture as a standard of appropriate behavior in colonial 
warfare and Britain’s counterinsurgency doctrine was still based on civilian 
targeting and exemplary force.58 Historians also point out that Britain struggled 
with a shortage of manpower affecting intelligence collection capabilities in every 
decolonisation conflicts.59 Finally, civil authorities and military commanders were 
reluctant to restrain the security forces, as they believed that tight constraints on 
the use of violence would undermine troops’ morale and combat effectiveness.60 
Under these conditions, military organisational factors would be expected to fuel 
British brutality. Interestingly, historians argue that military culture, lack of 
information about the enemy, and the permissive attitude of civilian and military 
leaders would help explain some forms of British violence like torture during 
screening operations and indiscriminate shootings in Kenya, or the use of 
counter-terror in the initial phase of the Malayan Emergency.61 
 Military organisational factors, however, have more causal importance when 
political leaders and civil agencies are not directly involved in the repression of 
insurgents and the army is the only organisation in charge to deal with the 
enemy’s popular base; otherwise, the impact of political leaders and agencies 
other than the army should be assessed. The theoretical scholarship on military 
organisational factors and civilian victimisation in counterinsurgency tends to 
ignore the role of political leaders and civil agencies as perpetrators of violence 
against non-combatants. Indeed, that scholarship sticks to a dichotomy between 
political leaders’ alleged preference for ‘the use of limited force to reassure allies, 
persuade insurgents to negotiate, or deny insurgents a country’s population 
centres’ versus the institutional preference of military organisations for 
overwhelming force to destroy the insurgent’s sanctuaries in the civilian 
population.62 As a result, civilian intervention in the planning and conduct of 
counterinsurgency campaigns is only seen as a source of self-restraint, while the 
use of indiscriminate violence is mostly attributed to military organisations and 
their commanders. Yet, political leaders and civil agencies can propel civilian 
targeting to such an extent that military organisational factors may not be 
sufficient to explain the use of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency. 
Interestingly, revisionist historians show that British political leaders, the civil 
administration and the police – while acknowledging the operational autonomy of 
military commanders – did not yield their authority to the British Army and 
played an active role in the punishment of civilians.63 Consequently, the 
organisational interests, military culture, and force structure of the British Army 
would not be enough to explain a significant part of British violence against non-
combatants in important cases. 
 British counterinsurgency in Kenya supports this point. Recent historical studies 
on the Kenya Emergency reveal that political leaders were responsible for some 
of the most brutal policies against non-combatants, while the police and loyalist 
auxiliary units – like the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) and the Home Guard (HG) 
– were routinely involved in the victimisation of civilians.64 
For example, it was the Governor of Kenya himself – Sir Evelyn Baring – that 
adopted a policy of mass evictions against Kikuyu people living on settlers’ land 
since the beginning of the campaign, displacing at least 70,000 civilians – mostly 
women and children – between November 1952 and April 1953.65 Once evicted, 
civilians were deported to overcrowded African Reserves where they would be 
left homeless and hungry. Even if intelligence reports warned that mass evictions 
would cause famine and death, the Governor insisted to carry on with that policy 
because it would appease white settlers and prevent the rebellion from spreading 
to other Provinces.66 
 Secondly, extrajudicial executions were frequent and did not involve only the 
British Army. In fact, the KPR and the HG, which were under the civil 
administration in the colony,67 perpetrated the fiercest reprisals against non-
combatants. In March 1953, after some Mau Mau gangs killed 120 loyalist 
civilians in Lari, the HG and the KPR retaliated by shooting at least twice as 
many people indiscriminately.68 In June 1953, the HG killed 400 non-combatants 
as a reprisal after the insurgent assassinated the son of a loyalist leader.69 
Importantly, while military commanders tried to restrain the Army, the KPR and 
the HG escaped military discipline and their conduct towards non-combatants did 
not change significantly.70 
 Finally, the civil administration, the police and the HG also stood out for their 
systematic brutality against the civilians deported to new villages after January 
1954; the British Army, instead, had little to do with the conditions of living in 
detention camps. Indeed, while the British Army carried out mass deportations, 
only the Governor and the civil administration were in charge to manage 
approximately 840 new villages where the police and the HG watched over 
inmates and imposed the infamous rehabilitation programmes through torture.71 
Infant mortality in punitive villages was high because of systematic food 
deprivation, intentional neglect of sanitation, and denial of medical care.72 Given 
the insignificant role of the British Army in the management of new villages, 
military organisational factors cannot have had a decisive causal effect on the fate 
of inmates from 1954 onwards. In sum, explanations based uniquely on those 
factors would miss a very important part of British violence in Kenya.73  
Political science theses based on military organisational factors would meet 
with serious difficulties in other cases too. For example, the force structure 
argument could not easily explain Britain’s conduct towards civilians in the 
counterinsurgency campaigns in Palestine and Cyprus.  
That might seem surprising. Indeed, those campaigns would display a 
correlation between Britain’s limited use of military machines and self-restraint 
towards civilians. Yet, a deeper look into those cases would disclose serious flaws 
in the causal mechanism of the force structure argument. The causal mechanism 
of the force structure thesis is based on two statements: a) preference for 
manpower over machines is likely to generate popular support for the 
counterinsurgent and successful collection of information about the enemy, while 
preference for machines will generate the opposite effect; b) successful collection 
of intelligence about the enemy is likely to result in selective violence, while 
failure to get information about the opponent would lead to indiscriminate 
violence.  
The cases of Palestine and Cyprus contradict both statements: Britain’s 
preference for manpower was followed by the persistent hostility of the local 
population and very limited intelligence gains; failure to obtain popular support 
and information about the enemy was still followed by British self-restraint 
towards civilians rather than indiscriminate violence. 
In both conflicts, Britain mostly relied on light infantry and police units.74 The 
preponderant use of manpower should have resulted in successful collection of 
information from civilians, but in fact the British would struggle to make 
intelligence gains against resilient guerrilla insurgencies that could count on the 
support of the Jewish settlers of Palestine and the Greek Cypriot population 
respectively.75 The local population was a crucial source of shelter, information, 
and resources for insurgents and prevented Britain’s victory in both campaigns. 
Indeed, civilians’ stubborn refusal to cooperate with Britain left the security 
forces without valuable information, thus affecting the counterinsurgent’s ability 
to locate and destroy the insurgent.76 While Britain struggled to obtain 
information about the enemy, the insurgent successfully infiltrated the security 
forces – especially the police – and eliminated members of the Special Branch as 
well as Britain’s informers.77 In Cyprus the insurgent used spies, informers, and 
selective violence so effectively that police officers tendered mass resignations 
out of fear to be killed.78 That would be inconsistent with the causal chain posited 
by the force structure argument, according to which the predominance of 
manpower over machines should enable the counterinsurgent to gather 
intelligence successfully.  
 Under those conditions of serious lack of information – surprisingly following 
from Britain’s preference for manpower – the force structure argument would 
predict an escalation of indiscriminate violence by Britain. That, however, did not 
happen. Despite its failure to win over the local population and obtain 
information about the insurgency, the British security forces never used 
indiscriminate executions, torture, scorched earth tactics, food denial, and mass 
deportation in Palestine and Cyprus. In order to break civilians’ resistance, the 
security forces resorted to bloodless methods like cordon-and-search operations, 
mass screening, mass arrests, collective fines, and property destruction.79 These 
measures did not change the behaviour of the populace and bombing attacks, 
ambushes, and sabotage operations could not be stopped; yet, the British never 
responded by targeting civilians with brute force. During the campaign in Cyprus, 
detainees frequently asserted that the security forces tortured prisoners, but recent 
historical studies show that most complaints – not all – were propaganda 
fabrications.80 
 The cases of Britain’s counterinsurgency campaigns in Palestine and Cyprus 
would also challenge the vilification argument. Indeed, as Britain realised that 
civilians would stand firm on their support for the insurgency, the Jewish and 
Greek Cypriot communities were demonised as willing accomplices of terrorism 
and the security forces would consider insurgents’ violence as a mere reflection of 
the abhorrent moral standards of the local population. In Palestine the association 
of the Jewish community with the insurgent was almost immediate and complete; 
as a result, the entire Jewish population was seen as ‘unscrupulous’, ‘utterly 
immoral’ and stubbornly committed to terrorism.81 
 In Cyprus, the initial belief of the colonial authorities that Greek civilians 
cooperated with EOKA out of fear was replaced by the perception that the Greek 
Cypriot community was a sadistic out-group willingly supporting terrorism.82 The 
assassination of British soldiers and civilians would be followed by news about 
Greek Cypriot ordinary people rejoicing on the murder scene, which was 
regarded as evidence of the ‘moral delinquency’ of the Greek community.83 The 
vilification of the Greek Cypriot community did not spare the Orthodox Church 
that was seen as ‘the cover organisation of the whole terrorist conspiracy’.84 
According to the colonial authorities, the Church used its ‘malignant power’ to 
indoctrinate Cypriot youths with Greek nationalism and turn them into killers.85 
Under these circumstances, the vilification argument would predict an escalation 
of civilian targeting in Palestine and Cyprus that, instead, never took place. 
Britain’s self-restraint in Palestine and Cyprus could be explained by pointing to 
the limited military power of the insurgent. That would confirm the desperation 
thesis according to which, if the insurgent poses only a minor military threat, the 
counterinsurgent will preserve its confidence in victory and refrain from targeting 
civilians. Yet, the desperation thesis would fail in other cases presenting 
favourable conditions, like the Kenya Emergency. 
The desperation thesis would predict self-restraint in Kenya, especially in the 
opening phase of the campaign that was marked by moderate optimism about the 
outcome of the conflict on the British side. Indeed, Mau Mau insurgents posed a 
minor military threat as they lacked modern guns and used spears, axes, and 
knives in most of their attacks. Unsurprisingly, they killed only 200 servicemen 
and no more than 1,800 civilians in eight years.86 Faced with an enemy that could 
hardly shoot to kill, the British maintained their confidence in victory. 
 Historians suggest that Britain’s initial optimism also depended on limited 
information about the enemy, which induced military commanders to 
underestimate the number of Mau Mau fighters. In his first assessment of the 
situation on the field as a Chief of Staff Officer in March 1953, General William 
N. Hinde claimed that there were just 13 Mau Mau gangs and a hundred hardcore 
fighters with no more than 55 guns.87 Few months later, the British authorities 
were still cautiously optimistic. In a telegram to the Colonial Secretary in May 
1953 the Governor of Kenya wrote: ‘the situation is better and the machine to 
deal with the rebellion greatly improved’; the Governor was relieved that there 
had been ‘no significant spreading of Mau Mau rebellion to other tribes’ and that 
‘Kikuyu are now coming into the open in increasing numbers in support of the 
Government’; Baring concluded that a swift victory was possible: ‘I remain 
convinced that if we can now press home our advantage we might finish them 
[Mau Mau] off quickly’.88 
 The problem with the desperation thesis is that Britain resorted to scorched 
earth, food denial, torture, free-fire zones and indiscriminate shootings in the first 
six months of the campaign against Mau Mau when the candidate causal factor of 
this thesis – desperation to win against a powerful and popular insurgency – was 
not present.89 This is a relevant flaw: considering insurgents’ extreme military 
weakness, the low number of combat losses suffered by the security forces, and 
Britain’s confidence in victory, the prediction that the counterinsurgent will be 
self-restrained in the early phase of a campaign when confronted with a minor 
military threat should have been easily confirmed. Britain, instead, used civilian 
victimisation as a strategy of early resort, even if it was not desperate to win yet. 
 Apparently, the desperation thesis would explain Britain’s self-restraint in the 
case of the Malayan Emergency. Alexander Downes, for example, considers the 
Malayan Emergency as a successful test for the desperation thesis: he claims that 
Britain refrained from civilian targeting because the insurgent was neither 
powerful nor popular.90 Downes, however, did not study the case of the Malayan 
Emergency in depth and looked at the conflict as a monolithic unit of analysis. In 
this way, Downes missed relevant variations in the strategy of Britain during the 
campaign and failed to notice that the Malayan Emergency, in fact, challenges the 
desperation thesis. 
Revisionist historians suggested that the Malayan Emergency can be 
disaggregated into different phases and highlighted that Britain used a different 
degree of coercion in each phase.91 The strategy of Britain in the early stage of 
the campaign in Malaya would call into question the explanatory power and the 
causal logic of the desperation thesis. Specifically, recent historical research on 
the Malayan Emergency shows that Britain targeted civilians in the first phase of 
the conflict. From July 1948 to December 1949, Britain used a counter-terror 
strategy based on indiscriminate shootings, scorched earth tactics including the 
burning of houses and villages and the coercive deportation of over 18,000 non-
combatants.92 The timing of British counter-terror in Malaya is inconsistent with 
the prediction that civilian targeting would occur as a measure of later resort. 
 More importantly, the reason behind the use of counter-terror does not confirm 
the causal logic of the desperation thesis that excludes that states may see 
indiscriminate violence as a convenient option to achieve a rapid victory against 
insurgents. Indeed, according to the desperation thesis, the counterinsurgent 
would prefer to avoid indiscriminate violence in the beginning of a conflict 
because it may increase civilians’ support for the insurgent and hinder a quick 
victory. 
 Recent historical studies, instead, indicate that Britain chose a counter-terror 
strategy in the opening phase of the Malayan Emergency because it was supposed 
to lead to a rapid victory against an enemy that had not built a large popular base 
yet. Both military commanders and the Cabinet insisted on the need to intimidate 
the Chinese population of Malaya in order to increase support for the colonial 
government and defeat the insurgency quickly as long as it was still far from 
becoming powerful and popular. As the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, 
put it in July 1948: ‘we want to strike hard from the start to make sure we are not 
faced with one of those lingering guerrilla campaigns’.93 Importantly, Britain’s 
early resort to indiscriminate violence occurred while the British believed that the 
security forces were having the upper hand in the conflict. Indeed, in the first few 
months of the campaign, the security forces took few casualties and intelligence 
reports indicated that counter-terror was undermining popular support for the 
insurgent.94 Clearly, counter-terror in Malaya was not a strategy of later resort 
deriving from frustration about casualties and war outcome on the British side.  
 
Conclusions 
As attempts to explain patterns of behaviour, theories provide ‘a common, more 
general and coherent explanation for a variety of specified cases’.95 A theory 
‘indicates that some factors are more important than others and specifies the 
relations among them’; in this way, a theory ‘connects otherwise disparate facts’ 
and ‘shows how changes in some of the phenomena necessarily entail changes in 
others’.96 A theory, in sum, is a simplified picture of reality that explains – and 
possibly predicts – why and how some causal factors lead to a specific outcome 
under certain circumstances.  
This article relied on the case study method and the congruence procedure to 
test political science theses of civilian victimisation in counterinsurgency against 
historical evidence about the campaigns of Britain in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, 
and Cyprus. Using revisionist historians’ studies on those campaigns as a source 
of data, I found that evidence often ran counter to the predictions and the causal 
logic of social scientific theses of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency. 
One may observe that the study of four cases would not refute those theses 
decisively. Indeed, like any other social scientific theory, current theses of 
civilian victimisation cannot be expected to account for the use of indiscriminate 
violence in every campaign; consequently, some anomalous cases may not be 
enough to disprove social scientific arguments on indiscriminate violence. 
That is true, but this article does not claim that revisionist historians’ research 
on British counterinsurgency has falsified political science theses of civilian 
victimisation conclusively. This article, instead, argues that there are very clear 
indications that the explanatory power and the posited causal logic of those theses 
are weaker than it may appear. Indeed, political science theses of indiscriminate 
violence often perform poorly in cases that should have been explained easily. As 
we have seen, Britain was one of the most democratic states in the world during 
the decolonisation era, it routinely vilified its irregular opponents, and it 
invariably faced insurgent groups that had very limited military power. Under 
those conditions, the predictions and the causal mechanisms of the theses that 
point to the primacy of regime type, the vilification of the enemy, and the military 
threat posed by the insurgent should have been easily confirmed; in spite of that, 
historical evidence often contradicted those theses. Revisionist historians’ studies 
on British counterinsurgency also suggest that the arguments explaining civilian 
targeting as a function of military organisational factors may actually miss the 
prominent causal role of political leaders and civil agencies as perpetrators of 
indiscriminate violence; therefore, those theses could not explain the level of 
brutality committed by non-military actors. Finally, revisionist historians brought 
up evidence that was inconsistent with the causal mechanisms of the theses 
pointing to military organisational factors, especially force structure. 
The test carried out in this article leads to the conclusion that political scientists 
should be more willing to reassess their arguments and ascertain how anomalous 
evidence emerging from historical research affects the veracity of their 
explanations. Unfortunately, political scientists have been slow to react. That is 
perplexing because social scientific theses of civilian victimisation often mention 
Britain’s decolonisation conflicts as a source of supporting evidence. More 
attention to the progress of the historiography of Britain’s counterinsurgency 
campaigns, therefore, would be necessary because it would enable political 
scientists to update the empirical foundation of their theses and refine the causal 
logic of their arguments accordingly. 
This is not to claim that no scholar is reassessing the literature on how states 
fight against insurgents and their supporters in the civilian population. In fact, 
scholars are exploring and refining some important arguments, especially the 
regime type thesis.97 This article supports this type of endeavour by showing that 
historical research on Britain’s decolonisation conflicts strengthens the case for a 
reappraisal of the main explanations for indiscriminate violence in 
counterinsurgency.98 
The case for political scientists to reassess their theses may not simply hinge 
upon the historiography of Britain’s decolonisation conflicts. Historical studies on 
the decolonisation wars of other states include data on relatively overlooked 
conflicts, like the French campaign in Madagascar (1947-1949), the Dutch 
campaign in the East Indies (1945-1949), or the Portuguese campaigns in Africa 
(1961-1974).99 Future research may explore the extent to which those studies 
confirm or further challenge political science explanations for civilian targeting. 
Interestingly, historical research on colonial wars may also point social 
scientists towards fruitful directions to revise their arguments. Political scientists 
have tried to explain civilian victimisation as the result of very few dominant 
independent variables that would overwhelm any other potential causal factor. 
That approach led to theses that may have oversimplified a complex phenomenon 
like indiscriminate violence and failed in easy tests. The dubious performance of 
political science theses would vindicate historians’ understanding of social and 
political phenomena as the product of different factors that converge 
simultaneously and interact with one another.100 Historical studies on imperial 
warfare – including expeditionary counterinsurgency – acknowledge that the 
image of the enemy, military doctrines, military culture, military technology, and 
insurgents’ skills in guerrilla warfare played an important role in shaping the level 
of brutality, along with other factors.101 Yet, those studies conclude that ‘no one 
factor was alone sufficient’ and ‘none was indispensable’ to explain the extent of 
indiscriminate violence: the brutality of colonial wars depended on combinations 
of intersecting and mutually reinforcing causes that would be difficult to 
disaggregate without losing explanatory power.102 
Future attempts to revise social scientific theses of civilian victimisation may 
build upon this insight. Instead of trying to isolate few independent variables that 
would be powerful enough to account for brutality against non-combatants, 
political scientists may develop more convincing theories by looking for groups 
of converging causal factors behind the incidence of civilian victimisation in 
counterinsurgency. 
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